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legal purpose, I think the answer should be dearly in the negative. As
indicated on page 1167 of the treatise, several of the current definitions
of value can be put to a variety of uses, and the acceptance of one definition, for example in a particular type of damage case, does not preclude
the acceptance of the same definition, for instance in a particular type
of tax case. On the other hand, different definitions of value may be required for various types of property that are to be valued for the same
purpose; and they may even be required for the same type of property
valued for the same purpose but held by different types of individuals5
Hence, my answer to the above question will afford small comfort to those
who seek a solution for the terribly complex problems of modern legal valuation in the development of some great, consistent system of value theory.
With the last part of the review, which suggests three other methods of
approach to a theory of valuation, I have no quarrel. Already the first
of these methods has long been accepted by economic theorists and is now
being applied to great advantage by appraisal experts, such as F. M.
Babcock. As the review indicates, our own study tries to interrelate all
three of them, although I dare say that our attempt has been crude and
faulty. To be sure, none of these three methods of approach will supply
answers to the types of questions emphasized in our book. But this statement is not meant to condemn them or to belittle their usefulness. Practical problems in the social sciences must be attacked from many different
angles and by many cross-classifications of the issues involved.
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I
OR many years valuation has been a contentious subject. The tremendous importance of the existence of effective regulatory power
to the citizen at his fireside and to government in action has been
attached in some way to valuation for purposes of discussion. The varieties of the adhesions are as numerous as the expressions. While legal
restraints are involved, necessarily the subject value carries economic features. Great names have imposed stifling effect on refutation by those
often characterized as lawyer-trained. Because, it is said, legal rules cannot equate economic balances. But the true economic standard does not
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seem to be clear even to great economists.x Because value sbunds of
worth and normally carries economic connotation economists say that
legal rules or the language of judges can never comprehend the evidence
nor properly direct the course of governmental regulation. It might seem
that either the belief in the nonexistence of a hereafter or of indifference
to eternal fires gives spontaneity to such iridescence. Perhaps it is a problem in legal education. On this it has been said that "It is merely another
way of saying that persons engaged in a highly complicated ceremonial,
filled with all sorts of symbolism in which they believe salvation is to be
found, are always disturbed by practical observations about the ceremonial. If they were not so disturbed, it would mean only that they did
not really believe in the ceremony. ' ' 2 The absence of disturbance is not
because they really believe but because they feel compelled by the force
of the established order to believe and at the same time recognize the infirmity of their position. It is this awareness of infirmity which makes the
challenge seem to charge a breach of faith or honesty such that only by
violent protestations can their declared purity and chastity be outwardly
preserved. Again, "Professor Robinson realized the truth of Alvin Johnson's remark that heretofore the union of the legal and social sciences has
been a beautiful example of cross-sterilization. ' 3 In the first place the
remark is not descriptive because in the theater referred to there has been
no union. At the most the stage has reflected an interfusion through which
the result is as if the whole had become gelatinous and the solids, though
in suspension, nevertheless remained in complete isolation. Thereafter the
shapeless mass tends to desiccate. If there had been fusion there could be
no cross-sterilization and the only question would be the virility of the
result. In the training of those who are to direct societal operation we are
not concerned with whether or not "The economist or the psychologist
must be willing to set aside his professional contempt for the law and
master some of its methods and doctrines before he can locate the points
where materials in his field might be helpful" but only with the statement
that the lawyer "will have to cease his reading of the latest cases and
become familiar in some degree with the concepts and theory of the
economist. ' 4 The cleavage never was by nature nor even by chance of
birth. The dissension is the result of shortsightedness of the lawyer on
one hand and of legal anosmia on the other. The result is a quarrel over
xCf. Hamilton, Price-By Way of Litigation, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1oo8, I024-i026 and notes
39

and 52 (1938).
Arnold, The Jurisprudence of Edward S. Robinson, 46 Yale L. J. 1282, 1283 (1937).
Note 2 supra.
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institutionalism and a failure to distinguish the occasion for direction and
the evidence which indicates the course. All are involved in governmental
regulation of business. Valuation is only an incident to that purpose. The
special knowledge of all expert training which is relevant is necessary to
its achievement. It is the purpose of this study to inquire if the established course of judicial decision makes impossible the utilization of these
forces for the common good.
II
Regulation in its broadest sense is nothing more than an attempt by
government to correct a supposedly economic maladjustment for the
common good. The sovereign's expression must be considered in terms of
its stature. This includes the nature of the scheme of government, its
relation with the individual, the authorized manner of declaration of such
standards of adjustment, the agencies through which the sovereign will
may be effected, the correlation between governmental agencies, s and the
conditions arising from constitutional limitation upon the expression of
valid general standards for public amelioration.
Nowhere else do fundamental constitutional principles receive so much
profession and so little appreciation as in the problem of governmental
regulation of public utility charges. While there may be other features to
the scheme of our constitutional government, we are here concerned only
with the limitations in favor of private liberty and property imposed upon
governmental action. If our governments are created to govern for the
common benefit under delimited powers, the manifestations of government may vary as expedient. Where rights and immunities are created in
the individual there is a correlative disability in the government. This is
the paramount distinction between our scheme of government and that
of the unlimited power of the governments of other nations. Our concern
here is not whether a better plan might be devised but whether existing
limitations preclude reasonable expediency in effecting an admittedly
wholesome public policy. We must first examine the common representation that the extension of the doctrine of judicial review, established in
Marbury v. Madison,6 to administrative rate-making has no constitutional
foundation. This is an error which is often brilliantly and forcefully insisted upon.7 Whatever the scope of the provisions of the original Constitution, since 1791 it has been clear that appropriation of private property
4 Katz, A Four-Year Program of Legal Education, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 527, 529 (1937).
s Cf. Smith, Non-judicial Administration of Law, 12 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 459 (1938).
6 XCranch (U.S.) 137 (1803).
7 Clark, Individualism and the Constitution, Reports of New York Bar Association (i934).
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for public use could not be made by the United States without compensation.' When the police power to destroy value and curtail previously
unrestrained liberty is exhausted further destruction is in effect an act of
illegal appropriation even though effected directly by primary legislative
action. Whether the destruction is achieved by primary or secondary
legislative action, the resulting illegal appropriations are identical. There
is no jurisdiction for governmental rate control of private business, and
public utility operation is private business, after rates are reduced below
what will produce a reasonable return. The full significance of the confiscatory nature of such uncompensated appropriation was not grasped in
the early years of the transition from an all powerful parliament to a
constitutionally limited legislature.9 The habit of thought was so complete that price fixing was an inherent legislative prerogative to be exercised at discretion that no case was brought to the Supreme Court under
the Fifth Amendment. There was less occasion to question state legislation under state constitutions and there was no provision of the federal
fundamental law to suggest attack on state legislation reducing charges to
consumers.' 0 Nor was there occasion for the consideration of the underlying concept until long after the states were brought under similar
restraint by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. As late as 1877 such
legislation was recognized by the Supreme Court as having existed "from
time immemorial" and was summarily dismissed as a political issue outside of the doctrine of judicial review with the comment that "for protection against such abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls
and not to the courts." ' ", Even in 189o a dissenting justice refers to confiscatory price regulation as a "legislative prerogative, and not a judicial
2
one.""1
Whether the imposition of a public servitude on the operation of

8

Fifth Amendment.

9 Cf. Riddell, The Constitution of Canada, "The prohibition 'Thou shalt not steal' has no
legal force upon the sovereign body," p. 13o ....
"a Provincial Parliament has the power to
say that the property of A shall hereafter be the property of B-and so it will be-and that
without the necessity of making compensation." "In Canada nobody is at all afraid that his
property will be taken from him .... Our people are honest as peoples go, and would not for a
moment support a government which did actually steal; a new government would be voted
into power and the wrong righted," pp. i48-i49.
xoThe amendments first added to the Constitution "contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments." Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet.
(U.S.) 243 (1833).
Cf. Guillotte v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 432 (1857) tracing legislation from 18o 7
fixing wages and prices of the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker without question
as to constitutionality.
- Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-4 (1877).
- Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (189o).
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utilities more burdensome than reduction of rates to a reasonable level
was the equivalent of the prohibited direct appropriation received more
extensive and constant consideration than perhaps any other theory of
constitutional principle. Through a course of powerful dissenting opinions
the purpose of protection of private property from governmental trespass
was found in 18go to be applicable to indirect action.13 If protection
against governme ital trespass has substance it necessarily must shield
the owner against destructive official action by whatever name the
agency be called. 4 Value becomes the legislative jurisdictional fact which
shows whether or not the private property was subject to destruction at
legislative discretion or whether a prohibited area was entered with resulting illegal uncompensated appropriation. This will receive further
treatment later.
III
Before proceeding with the function and determination of value it is
necessary for distinction to briefly observe the nature of the police power.
This is required by the common observation that there is no more occasion
to inquire about value in price regulation than in any other exercise of the
police power. .5 The police power is the residuary or inherent power of
either of our governments necessarily implied to make possible the purposes for which either government was created. Inherent through our concept of social compact to representative democracy is the principle that
initiative in official action is conditioned upon common or general welfare.
It is the Constitution which imposes the condition upon legislative-executive action which would otherwise be uncontrolled. With us the government is for the governed, the official is an agent and the official body an
agency authorized to act, in the police power, where the welfare of the
whole community requires the suppression of the individual's activity.
Unless the fact of common benefit exists the governmental action is arbitrary and malicious meddling. The correlative necessarily receives the
phrasing that freedom from regulation of private property and business is
the plan and regulation is the exception. Our Constitution by stipulation
X3Note I2 supra. Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886): "This

power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation (of rates) is not the equivalent of
confiscation. Under pretense of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in
law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law."
X4For the relationship between the courts and legislative action whether direct or indirect
see Smith, op. cit. supranote 5.

IsCf. Hale, Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility Rates, 38 Col. L. Rev. 959 (1938).
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established immunities from governmental action. This novelty which
characterizes our political order gave rise to the contention that the general police function was withdrawn. The negative answer is spontaneous
and has always been recognized. 6 While the general police power has always existed it has always been limited 7 by stipulated immunity from
governmental or legislatively imposed servitudes upon private property
unless the common need is established. When the need exists the power to
destroy is absolute. When the need is satisfied the immunity is absolute
unless the taking is compensated. Appropriation only begins when the
immunity is violated. The impingement is fully recognized: "The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such
fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon a substantial
group of people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted
interference with individual liberty."' 8 The existence of the common need
x6 Speaking of the subject the Court has from the first presentation always carried forward
the gist of its answer in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1824), namely, that equally
fundamental with the position of the individual is the power of all of the people through their
common agency to regulate for the general welfare. Speaking specially of inspection laws the
Court said that such laws form "a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces
all of which can be most advantageously exeverything within the territory of the state ....
ercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as lawsfor regudatinginternalcommerce of a state, .... are component parts
of this mass." (Italics added.) The power of Congress "to regulate commerce" is a power
which is subject to the same limits in the commerce among the states as is the power of the
states to regulate practices within their jurisdiction. "The incidental effect which such reasondoes not constitute a taking but only a reasonable regulation
able rules may have, if any ....
in the exercise of the police power of the national government." Chicago Board of Trade v.
Olson, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). "We have frequently said that in the exercise of its control over interstate commerce, the means employed by Congress have the quality of police regulations."
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 346 (1937).
X7"In the ratification of the Constitution these guaranties were not thought sufficient. The
ratifying convention of Virginia proposed on June 27, 1788, that a declaration of rights (together with other changes) be inserted in the new Federal Constitution. The New York convention about a month later adopted an elaborate declaration of rights. In the ratification by
these and other states, there was a substantial agreement that certain individual rights should
be guaranteed through constitutional amendment. On August x, 1788, the North Carolina
convention declined to ratify the Constitution without a declaration of rights and other amendments, and ratification by this state came on November 21, 1789, after Congress had submitted
twelve proposed amendments. Rhode Island did not ratify until May 29, 179o, and even at
that late date proposed a series of amendments, some of which had already been submitted
to the states by Congress. The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution, proposed by
the First Congress in 1789 and ratified in 1791, may thus be regarded as supplements to the
original Constitution as framed in 1787." Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law 793 (2d ed.
'937).
is Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934). Italics added.
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is the legislative jurisdictional fact whatever the nature of the infection
to the body politic. If it does not exist the consequence of the legislative
action is not legal destruction but illegal appropriation of private property. Unless there may be judicial review of the legislative-administrative
action there is no constitution.' 9 Even in the dearest possible case the
property owner is entitled to a determination of the propriety of the claim
of police power. "The right to so seize and destroy is, of course, based
upon the fact that the food is not fit to be eaten ..... A determination on
the part of the seizing officers that the food is in an unfit condition to be
eaten is not a decision which concludes the owner. ' '2° Referring to Lawton
v. Steele the Court said the owner "would not be bound by the determination of the officers who destroyed them, but might question the fact by an
action in a judicial proceeding in a court of justice," and if he can show
"that the alleged nuisance did not exist, he will recover judgment, notwithstanding the ordinance ....under which the destruction took
place." While it is true that there is no more occasion for determining
judicially the legislative jurisdictional fact for police power price-fixing
than in any other exercise of the police power there is obviously just as
much. It exists in all cases upon the plea of confiscation. There is, therefore, no distinguishing feature in the issue we are pursuing. This returns
us again to the question of how price reduction could have been held to be
property destruction so as to be within the scope of this doctrine. Nothing
could seem simpler than that if the constitution provides immunity to the
private owner from direct action there is no force to the prohibition to
governmental action unless indirection having the same consequence as
direct legislation is also within the prohibition. Thus the evolution of
decision from Munn v. Illinois into Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul v.
Minnesota was not misdirection but inevitable.21
IV
That official discretion is not unlimited in price-fixing is the great
obstacle to the validity of such conduct. If we can identify the function of
19Note 6 supra.
20 North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6 (igo8).
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 (1938), the Court says: "We
may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a Legislature can forestall attack
upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets
to the prohibited act, and that a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof
in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving
the suitor of life, liberty, or property had a rational basis." The question for decision was
whether the statutory characterization of filled milk as injurious to health and as a fraud upon
the public precluded judicial inquiry into the nature and effect of the practices and facts. Cf.
Filled Milk Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 61-63.
21Cf. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (x935).
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the rate base the purpose and determination of constitutional tests will be
less obscure and difficult. When an infection threatens, it can be controlled by whatever degree of supervision is necessary to protect either the
body-politic or the body-natural for the general welfare of the state. The
individual may be confined in the use of his property or his personal
liberty. His beautiful cedar trees or his dairy herd may be destroyed; his
buildings may be limited in height or use; if he is a typhoid-carrier he may
be indefinitely incarcerated; he may not permit his jungle tiger to roam
the crowded streets. All of such regulationsare only examples of the correction of maladjustment to an acceptable standard. The means employed to achieve that end are valid if they have a substantial relation to
the policy being pursued.
There are many types of correctable economic maladjustments of
which the best marked is the common law monopoly. Perhaps the chief
reason for its ostracism was its effects on prices. Certainly it is dear at
this date that if the correction requires control of prices, prices as any
other incident of private property can be abated. If the social disease be
as it was in the Nebbia case 2 no issue of return or base arises. We are concerned only with whether a utility has charged too much. And we may
define a utility for our purpose as an industry upon which the community
has become so dependent that it is no longer privileged to pirate its position of vantage by unsupervised pricing. The only alleged wrongdoing is
piracy or extortion through its position. The object of the regulation is not
to fix any percentage of profit on investment much less to value the property. It is to reduce charges to consumers, a public servitude imposed
upon utility property described as devoted to a public use. 2 3 If the owner's
investment justifies his profits the state has no jurisdiction to reduce his
charges. That the police power extends to excessive charges is not open to
discussion. The only function which the base can have in the program of
rate making is as a partial defense to show that the difference between the
owner's outlay and his inlay is not exaggerated. How the state computes
the base or what it is found to be cannot control if the owner is unable to
establish that the capital value devoted to the public is so great that the
net operating return leaves so small a margin of profit that the Court must
say that the state has exceeded its sovereign power and has imposed an
2

Note i8 supra.

23 "Therefore ....

the income actually in enjoyment cannot be a factor in determining the
value of the property at all, because that is the very unknown quantity we are endeavoring to
of this bill and the valuation that is proposed is to
make specific." "The very purpose ....
enable us to ascertain in a proper way whether a given income enjoyed by a particular common
carrier is too large or too small." Senate Rep. i29o, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 701 (1913).
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excessive use or servitude upon private property.24 When must the judiciary hold legislative-executive action violative of constitutional limitation? In addition to the inertia of the judiciary in cases of departmental
over-reaching police power issues carry a wider border for legislative
choice than do ordinary cases. What measure may the state use to ascertain the borderline to go beyond which must be held to be trespass?
V
All agree that regulation of utility charges is necessary and desirable.
The task at any event is not a simple one. The expense, delay, and disruption to business caused by frequent valuation proceedings are enormous.
If constant repetition of reappraisement be necessary few will approve and
none can justify regulation of private property by such dilatory, expensive, and irritating practices. So far, because of them, except in isolated
instances, regulation has not been regulation in fact but license for exploitation. 25 There is nothing in the decisions of the Supreme Court which
approves, much less requires, such methods.
In the first place a misplaced emphasis has been attached to the base
while the important factor is return .26 As will be later pointed out, this
was consistent with the interest of at least one side's position and directed
the Court's attention particularly to one and not the other. Extended
discussion of issues pressed does not mean decision of relative importance.
Our terms are expenses, rates, profit return, value, and income. All are
expressed in money. None is for this purpose a tangible physical thing to
be measured by some arbitrary, infallible, fixed standard. While return
must be kept in mind throughout and will be developed at more length
after the base is discussed some immediate attention must be given to its
relative importance.
The peculiar legal position of the regulated, monopoly public utility, as
compared to competitive industry is well recognized. In Hegeman Farms
24 Cf.

Portsmouth Harbor Land &Hotel Co. v. United States,

260

U.S.

327 (1922);

United

States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).

"The legislative discretion implied in the rate-making power necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the method used in reaching the legislative determination as
well as that determination itself. We are not concerned with either, so long as constitutional
limitations are not transgressed. When the legislative method is disclosed, it may have a definite bearing upon the validity of the result reached, but the judicial function does not go beyond the decision of the constitutional question. That question is whether the rates as fixed
are confiscatory. And upon that question the complainant has the burden of proof, and the
court may not interfere with the exercise of the State's authority unless confiscation is clearly
established." Los Angeles Gas Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
2sCf. McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419 (1938), dissenting opinion.
26Cf. Los Angeles Gas Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
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Corporation v. Baldwin 7 after pointing out that the Constitution "does
not protect a business against the hazards of competition," the Court says
that when subjected to maximum rates "a public utility .... has no outlet of escape. If it is running its business with reasonable economy, it must
break the law or bleed to death. In a business not subjected to maximum
prices "If the price is not raised, the reason must be that efficient operators find that they can get along without a change."
Much of the misplacement of emphasis upon the value of the plant is
due to the fact that return has usually been expressed as a percentage. An
expression for convenience is subjected to the charge that it is an ossified
formula. How this form of expression came to be used is of little concern.
Its significance in rate-making is important. The reason for price regulation is not that the rate is high but that the owner is taking too much
profit. There can be no profit until expenses are paid. When the capital
employed is determined and the costs of operation are computed, it is of
little importance whether one is expressed as a percentage of the other or
not. What is important is that costs must be deducted from receipts before any question of profits can arise. While the value of the use of money
in the particular type of risk may be a factor, that it is only one is fully
recognized by the Court. "Sound business management requires that
after paying all expenses of operation, setting aside the necessary sums
for depreciation, payment of interest and reasonable dividends there
should still remain something to be passed to the surplus account; and
the rate of return which does not admit of that being done is not sufficient
to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility to maintain
its credit and enable it to raise money necessary for the proper discharge
of its public duties. ''21 Whether sums received from rates for necessary
operating costs equal three or four or twice as much more percent of the
capital account they must be allowed for in the rate. They command the
percentage. They are independent of any ratio. In fact in their determination the capital account is irrelevant. The properties are involved
because it is the cost of their efficient employment that is to be predetermined. When these have been adequately provided for, as it is only the
whole return and not its separate component parts with which the judicial
inquiry is concerned, it becomes apparent that the probability of unconstitutionality of the legislative-administrative action is minimized. There
is another factor which may even be controlling. It is public policy. While
the state has the power to destroy value reflected from profits to the point
27

293 U.S. 163, 171 (1934).

28

United Railways & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (193o).
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of confiscation it is not compelled to exhaust its power. It need not regulate at all. These are the two extremes. The latter has been eliminated by
the facts. But in the exercise of administrative discretion something more
than the utilities' constitutional right may be allowed in the return without violating any consumer's right to minimum rates. If such allowance is
made the probability of judicial interference is again reduced as the excess
is a part of the whole and only the whole return concerns the judiciary.
If it appears that all proper operating costs have been compensated this
excess becomes allocable to any deficiency which might appear in the
allowance for use of the owner's capital impounded in the plant. We must
now examine the standards insisted upon by the Court for the determination of this element. When determined, the consideration which it must
receive in the rate and return becomes paramount.
VI
We are brought to the problem of the so-called rate base. It has been
demonstrated that the only function of what is commonly referred to as
the base or value of the plant relevant in the process of judicial review of
administrative-legislative action is as a partial defense in support of the
plea of confiscation. The rate-making body should consider it, firstly, in
order to stay within its authority, and, secondly, to demonstrate, when its
action is judicially questioned, that it has made allowance therefor as
great as the owner's constitutional right. Smyth v. Ames 9 has been approved in every case since its decision whenever the plea of confiscation
from regulated utility rates has been before the Court. No decision having
so much influence upon the economic and political adjustments has received such consistent and repeated approval by specific or included citation and confirmation. It is not merely a case but a course of decision and
justifies extended treatment to assure a common meeting ground. Did the
Court say that the legislature should allow a reasonable return on a fund
equivalent to the actual expenditure of the owner, or what it would cost
at the date of the fixing of the rates to build the same plant or one as
adequate, or that the value base should be found by capitalizing as some
specified rate the income (gross or net) being earned under the existing
unregulated rate, or did it say that upon the most reliable evidence
available the issue of confiscation should turn upon such sum of money
as at the time of construction and consistent with sound and honest
business practices would have been required to produce the presently
29

169

U.S. 466 (i89S).
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useful plant and which impounded through it is devoted to the use of
the public?
If the judicial issue is whether the utility owner is being paid too little
for the use of his property and that payment is in money, while the plant
is composed of physical sticks and stones and steel, and for convenience,
the courts sometimes employ the term physical value, the value referred
to cannot be a physical trait but must be a relationship also expressed in
terms of money. This is inescapable regardless of how either return or
value are to be determined. While the balance must be struck by the
weight of reason and practical experience and not by the weight of lead
the same may be said of other adjustments of human and legal relations
and supplies no novelty or devastation to the task of regulation. The use
of the term value where the function of the relationship is different neither
makes its uses synonymous nor the functions identical any more than is
true of the different adjective functions of other words, i.e., good, bad,
red, and yellow.
VII
When competitive business or properties are sold the price is the relative
attractiveness of the going concern compared to a sum of money described by the price to the seller and buyer. It is stated as the amount for
which the property would sell under ordinary conditions as contrasted
with a forced sale. This market or exchange value is computed by capitalizing anticipated net earnings under a specified rate. The basis of this
estimate, and it is an estimate, is the earning power of the business as a
going concern. But earning power depends upon rates, and where the rate
is the issue to use exchange value as the rate base would be to establish
rates by the rates themselves. Since market value is primarily a capitalization of earning power and earning power depends upon rates, we cannot
find rate-making value by exchange standards. If exchange value were
the base for rate-making, no rate could be reduced without a destruction of
property because ordinarily property would be destroyed to the extent that
capitalization of rates under reduced rates is less than under existing rates.
Although the Supreme Court has definitely, continuously, and repeatedly rejected exchange value as the rate base many still talk as if the
contrary were true. Prior to 1898 the Court had treated the question of
value in regard to taxation and condemnation. 3° In each the purpose is
30 Cf. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 8i (x913): "The owner must be
compensated for what is taken from him; but that is done when he is paid its fair market value
for all available uses and purposes."; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. E89,
i95 (x91o): "The question is, whathas the ownerlost, notwhat has the taker gained."; United
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to leave the individual in as good a position comparatively as if he had
not been visited by the state-in expropriation to leave him with what he
could have sold for at the time; in taxation in a position in comparison
with other taxpayers so that their relative position is maintained. The
Court was neither ignorant nor careless in excluding this test as the measure of value of the rate base in Smyth v. Ames. "The probable earning
capacity under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses" is often quoted from that case as
requiring a capitalization of earnings to find the base value. But the Court
was familiar with the measure of value in condemnation and taxation
cases and within a year sanctioned a reduction of rates at the same time
that it affirmed the facts evidentiary of value as therein declared for ratemaking, it could not have intended exchange value to be the measure of
the rate base.3' The above quotation was not used in that case to establish capitalization of earnings as the measure of the rate base value but
was used in connection with rate-making policy (as will subsequently
be shown) to test a rate which, operating in the future, will provide a
reasonable return without the need of immediate revision to avoid confiscation.32 At any event operating expenses would have to be met before
there would be any income to capitalize.
States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (X923): "The owner was entitled to the
full money equivalent of the property taken, and thereby to be put in as good position pecuniarily as it would have occupied, if its property had not been taken."
3' Cf. Note 13 supra. Six years after the Railroad Commission cases and four years before
Smyth v. Ames the Court recognized that rates could be constitutionally reduced. Regan v.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). Market value measured by capitalization
of earnings was approved for expropriation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 328 (1893), the Court saying: "The value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness,-the profits which its use brings to the owner ..... These
tolls, in the nature of the case, must enter into and largely determine the matter of value."
The Court had always noticed that reduction of utility rates destroys value. In Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 143 (1877), it was said by Justice Field that if rates were reduced "the
amount fixed will operate as a partial destruction of the value of the property, if they fall below
the amotnt which the owner would obtain by contract," and it was recognized by the Court
that the reduction would "operate as a partial destruction." Id., at 134.
"The property is not ordinarily the subject of barter and sale and, when rates are in dispute, earnings produced by rates do not afford a standard for decision. The value of the property, or rate base, must be determined under these inescapable limitations. And ....the
Court has refused to be bound by any artificial rule or formula which changed conditions might
upset. We have said that the judicial ascertainment of value for the purpose of deciding whether rates are confiscatory "is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment, having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts." Los Angeles Gas &
Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 305 (x933).
32Cf. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 258 U.S. 165 (1922): "When it became clear that the prescribed rate had yielded no fair return. for more than a year, and that
this condition would almost certainly continue for many months, the company was clearly entitled to relief."
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VIII
Under the conditions existing in 1898, the lines of the Union Pacific
'could have been built across the State of Nebraska for about $2o,ooo a

mile. Because of "injudicious contracts, poor engineering, unusually high
cost of material, rascality on the part of those engaged in the construction
and management of the property," under the conditions existing at the
time of construction, the cost to the security holders was nearly five times
that much. In Smyth v. Ames the utility contended for a valuation measured by the securities issued and bitterly opposed the argument of the
State for a base measured by the then cost of reproducing the properties.
With the turn of the century construction costs began to rise rapidly. As
the previously made expenditure did not change the graph lines soon
crossed. As the two approached each other the importance of either position decreased. The cost at any given time of building similar property
became the greater, and as the trend remained rather constantly upward
while the value once claimed remained constant, reproduction new became
the lodestone of the utilities in all valuation for rate-makng.33 Finding no
embarrassment in changing their position, they naturally sought to fortify
their new entrenchment. They argued that the word "present," adjective
of "value," called for a complete review and reappraisement in reaching a
"reasonable judgment" figure on all evidentiary facts thereof for and
during each rate period. As the trend was upward this was constantly
self-serving. Secondly, it was contended that the present cost of reproducing the existing property is the exclusive measure (plus, of course,
going value, etc.) of value for rate-making. "This insistence upon cost of
reproduction new at current prices to the exclusion of everything else, or
at least everything that might tend to lower value, calls for the closest
scrutiny. ' 34
The cost of reproduction is asserted by its proponents as the true basis
of what the present physical plant is "worth." The difficulty here is that,
if we inquire the present worth of the existing plant, we must look at it
either as a living concern, or at it as dismembered, or as assembled but devitalized. The first calls for a capitalization of earnings, which valuation is
irrelevant as evidentiary of value for rate-making. The second commands
only scrap value, and the third is beyond the realm of facts. It is purely
speculative to imagine what a new company would pay for the plant with"3Naturally there was little litigation when no material difference would result from the acceptance of either theory as the measure. When the intersection was safely passed the utilities
quite graciously took the cue and in the Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U.S. 352 (1913), the orphan
reproduction new was definitely adopted.
34 Excess Income of the Manufacturers Railway Company, 124 I.C.C. Rep. 3 (1927).
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out a franchise in preference to building an imaginary new plant. Neither
such new company nor such purchase is possible under the facts. The
plant is part of a going business. This test would call for the cost of.
reproducing the service and not the (physical) value of the existing plant.
Assuming such imaginary buyer would look only at the plant without the
business, in contemplating the construction of a new plant he would be
concerned only with duplicating the service or the production not of an
identical plant but of a plant of equal capacity. Obsolescence may make
this possible at a fraction of the cost of building an identical plant.
The reproductionists claim allowance for unearned increment because,
it is said, there is no reason for allowing it in competing business and
denying this stimulus to investment in utilities. Among other reasons why
this claim is without merit are those involved in realization. In unregulated competing properties enjoying a market for other uses, unearned
increment may be realized through sale. Regulated public utility properties are not for sale and whether neighborhood changes create or destroy
the attractiveness of the property for other uses is wholly immaterial on
the question of costs either to the owner or to the consumer. If it did have
some relevancy to the utility operator it becomes a two-edged sword. 35
From pure economic theory appreciation instead of being added to the
capital account and reflected in an increased charge to consumers with
more propriety might be charged as income to the owner and taxed as
such. 36 It is further said to be a social loss unless allowance is made when
consumers would pay more for some other use. Again, we are dealing with
utilities-they are regulated and a substituted use in this sense is beyond
the practical. Further, the argument involves the use of an element sought
to be found as a means of finding it. If the community is willing to pay for
the utility service at a reasonable rate, it is as socially desirable in this
sense as any other service. Neither does the theory solve the question of
is "Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two
points of time." Haig, The Concept of Income (1921).
36 "It was possible at the outset to say that capital gains and losses were not income at all;
they are not popularly so regarded, and in Great Britain for example they are not taxed as
such. In this country we have decided otherwise, and that step taken, we might have gone
further and said that any increase in value was income; that would have been awkward in administration;-it would involve an annual appraisal of all the taxpayer's goods-but it would
have been rational. The Supreme Court held otherwise; the gain must be 'realized." Hewitt
Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 88o, 884 (C.C.A. 2d 1935); per Judge Learned Hand.
Another objection is that a change in the money worth of a commodity at the end of a period
may be nothing but a fall in the value of gold. Foreign unearned increment taxes have removed this objection by reference to index prices. Cf. Helvering v. Winmill, 59 S. Ct. 45, 47
and note zo (1938).
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economic waste in a monopoly serving a traffic which would not move
under a rate high enough to yield a normal return on present construction
costs, because the present construction cost to measure economic justification would be the cost of reproducing the service through the most
efficient hypothetical new plant imaginable and not the present, partially
obsolete, plant.
Without emphasizing forces of competition in unregulated fields, the
argument is frequently made in favor of reproduction new as the only
means of securing new construction. If new plants are to be built, the cost
is measured by prices at the time of construction and return must be
allowed on these prices. But as the new would compete with the existing
and if their prices were limited to prudent investment their rates would
be lower than the new utility could meet without sacrifice of investment,
therefore, new construction will be discouraged unless reproduction new
is adopted as the rate base. In parallel it is argued that reproduction new
will encourage just enough construction to handle economically justified
traffic. The fallacy of these arguments is indicated above. It should be
noted also that it is a fallacy to segregate additional earnings and new
capital required for extensions from earnings and cost of the entire plant.
History has shown the utter futility of attempting to enforce such a
theory.
The cost of reproduction seems to fluctuate more widely than any other
suggested rate base. This is so because it is wholly an estimate making
possible extravagant self-serving assertions as well as wide differences of
opinions expressed in good faith. The records show variances ranging to
several hundreds percentum both between sides and between the experts
of the same side. The variables are so great that if in fact there were not
wide differences the probability of independent estimates would be slight.
There is no check or balance to weigh against a conclusion other than
some other "expert." Aside from witnesses' individual differences vertical
fluctuations have been violent and its instability as a rate base is shown
by the annual fluctuations. Violent fluctuation has been rather common
since the World War. A familiar example demonstrates the deceitfulness
of this base theory. The round number steam railroad valuation under
cost of reproduction new was eighteen billions in 1919, forty-one billions

in

1920,

thirty-five billions in

1921,

twenty-two billions in

1922,

and

thirty-one billions in 1923. During the same period the net additions and
betterments were around four billions. It would have been much cheaper
for the country to have given the additions than to gratify the reproductionists' theory of attracting new capital and so to have permitted the
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increase of the public debt some twenty billions. The opposite consequence attaches to the expenditures actually made during the high
prices-nearly fifty per cent would have been wiped out within a year.
This instability is enhanced by the uncertainty of the time when the
revaluation may be made. Theoretically it should be made with each
material shift. This would mean the breakdown of all regulation. In spite
of the obvious, unearned increment is held forward as an attraction to
capital. But about two-thirds of the outstanding securities are fixed income and so unaffected while the balance in common shares becomes a
sinkhole.
The companion argument is that reproduction new by following prices
stabilizes income and stimulates construction during low cost periods in
order to gain advantage of future rises. No one knows when or if prices
37
will rise and the utility cost cycle varies widely from other cost cycles.

Further complications arise from the fact that extensive utility construction affects other commodity prices which in turn affect utility construction costs.
The reproductionists answer the allegation that reproduction new as a
base is expensive, uncertain and highly litigious by the assertion that it is
simple and stimulates efficiency. Administratively simple, it is said, because it can be brought down to date by index multipliers. The practical
difficulty with the multiplier argument is that often there are no facts
upon which reliable multipliers may be computed. The multipliers during
such periods must be compiled largely from manufacturers' records and
price statistics, but these are not market prices as the purchases were not
made, and they do not allow for improved methods of assembly and construction. An increase in the former might be offset by a decrease in the
latter.35 Disregarding these weaknesses, multipliers are not applicable to
the intangibles claimed nor even to the physical elements if the reproduction new base is measured by the cost of duplicating the service rather
than duplicating an obsolete equipment. 39 The efficiency argument has
been made only during the periods when the cost of reproduction new has
Cf. the reputed soundness of investment in 1930 in miniature golf courses.
From the date of Ames v. The Union Pacific Railway to 1914, because of economies, railroad construction did not vary greatly although wide differences occurred in the prices of labor
and materials. Taking the wages, etc., index with i99 as ioo, 1920-230, 1921-195, 1922157, and 1923-194, the change in rates would be: 192o-increase of 114 per cent, 19 21-decrease of 14 per cent, I922-decrease of i8 per cent, and I923-increase of io per cent. This
would hardly have been attractive to capital.
39 Cf. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935).
37

38
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been so high that regardless of efficiency a reasonable return thereon could
not be exceeded.
The rate assured the railroads during the period of federal control was
based on average net railway operating income for the three years i914i97 inclusive. This was determined without regard to prices. Business
judgment precluded a demand for a rate which would produce a reasonable return upon the cost of duplication. Public indignation would not
have tolerated such exorbitant charges where no expenditure had been
made. At no time during the period 1920-26 did the rails as a whole
receive as much as six per cent on reproduction new cost, but during that
period the market for their securities improved and the trend of interest
was downward. If rates had been computed on a reproduction new base
the increase in i92o would have been from about seventy-five to ninety
per cent instead of from about twenty-five to forty per cent. Assuming the
consumer would acquiesce, the profits would have gone to the common
shares. The converse of this is what makes the duplication base attractive
to the market manipulator.40 For example, the 192o prices as compared to
the 1914 prices would have justified doubling the security issue while at
present nearly one-half of them would be water. These wide fluctuations
make the fixing of rates for any period of reasonable duration impossible
with the result that adjustment would have to be made very frequently
if reproduction new were the measure of the rate base.41 Nothing could be
more disrupting to business than abrupt shifts in general rate levels.
Ix

In the foregoing discussion the term reproduction has referred to a
process of hypothetical duplication of the existing structures. It is also
used in another sense, namely, reproduction of the service. If we were
confronted with the task of building a plant, we must either duplicate the
existing plant or build one that is different. In industries controlled by
competitive forces, the entrepreneur is concerned only with what it will
cost him to place a commodity on the market. He is not interested in
duplication of obsolete machinery but with the cheapest and most efficient
modern devices. Prices under such conditions are supposed to be just
40

Cf. Re City of Grand Rapids, P. U. R. 1923 C, 494-95.
State Rate Case, Mass. P. U. R. igi6F, 221, 233; Westchester Street Ry. Case,

41 Cf. Bay

3 P. Ser. Comm. Rep. 286 (2d Dist. N. Y., 1912), where Commissioner Stevens said, "If it
(the Commission) takes reproductive cost only to be that value, it goes contrary to all experience and all sound canons of judgment"; Douglas Co. Light and Water Company Case (Oregon), P. U. R. 192oE, 666, 674; Hill v. Antigo Water Company, 3 Wis. R.C.R. 623 (i9o9).
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about the point where a competitor can afford, or cannot afford, to enter
the field. The value of a plant is about the cost of duplicating the service
rendered. If exchange value, or what a willing buyer will pay, were the
issue, duplication of the service must be considered because our buyer
would not pay more for an existing plant than what he thinks just as good
a plant would cost. To the extent that the service may be duplicated by
more efficient modern machinery, obsolescence has accrued in the existing
plant. This may go so far that the old plant is of little or no value for sale.
It might occur in the briefest period of time through new invention although there has been no physical depreciation. So far as the cost of reproduction new is advanced as the exclusive test of value for rate-making
this attack is overwhelming. Each assumes a competitive market for product or plant or both. Proof of value by evidence of reproduction cost presupposes that a plant like that being valued would be reconstructed, but
this is not true if it were obsolete. In value for rate-making reproduction
new cost is not the measure of the base but only the estimated cost at the
time of valuation of duplicating the physical plant used and useful in the
public service and is accepted as evidence in reaching a judgment estimate
of the amount reasonably necessary and expended in its production.
Utilities are not freely competitive and exchange value is irrelevant.
While functional depreciation as distinguished from physical may have
nothing, through the mere fact of its accrual, to do with the fair value of
the plant, it is a matter which should be considered in every accounting
system. Because of the fact that sooner or later the present equipment
must be replaced, charges should be set up against operating income. The
purpose is to spread the loss over a long period. But as the function of rate
making is to protect the fair investment,42 obsolescence not so provided
for cannot be deducted. It may accrue through competing enterprises although the special field is dosed-busses cut railroad patronage. In this
way functional depreciation may become important in rate making policy.
A lowering or other rate adjustment may multiply traffic so as to produce
a reasonable return. It may be that no adjustment of rates would produce
a reasonable return. The fact that no interest is paid does not disprove
the loan. Furthermore there is no constitutional guarantee to the owner
or lender of a substantial return. His right is limited to freedom from
interference with returns less than a fair return. While it is true that the
difference between scrap value of existing property and the cost of building a modern, efficient, new plant is the same no matter what caused the
42"Our concern is with confiscation. Rate making is no function of the courts." Pacific

Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (1924).
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failure to make the replacement, nevertheless the "consumers pay for
service, not for the property used to render it, ' ' 43 and the cost of reproducing the service is not the rate base, nor even a fact evidentiary of such
value. The consumers pay for the service but they pay for the reasonable
cost of service received under efficient operation of the existing plant, and
the cost of the service above quoted means what reasonable outlay was
necessary to render service received. This is shown by the facts in that
case, and other statements by the Court. There was no issue of reproducing the service, but merely if future deficient earnings could be made up
from past excesses. These excesses had been plowed into the plant, and of
them the Court says, "the just compensation safeguarded to the utility by
the Fourteenth Amendment is a reasonable return on the value of the
property used at the time it is being used for public service," and "constitutional protection against confiscation does not depend on the source
of the money used to purchase the property. It is enough that it was used
to render the service." Obviously reproduction of the service may be a
belaying-pin to the reproduction new proponents, but careless use of langauge in one instance cannot be made to spell reproduction of the service
as the rate base out of the New York Telephone case. Of course the public
pays for service. I should not pay subsidy to the Edison Company merely
because it owned a plant if no electricity is furnished. It is "compensation for the service given to the public, ' 4a a fact, with which we are concerned. Purely speculative theory is immaterial 4s and irrelevant, as are
exchange values and sales prices. In the Consolidatedand Des Moines Gas
46
cases value not represented by legitimate expenditure was excluded.
X
There is no case in the history of the Supreme Court wherein the Court
does not refer to the "cost" of property in connection with fair value for
rate-making. To ascertain this cost all relevant facts must be weighed
and a reasonable judgment reached without the aid of formulae. It is in
this that the cost of reproducing the present physical plant is a relevant
evidentiary fact. The plant presently used at the time of determination of
such ultimate fact is taken because that represents tangibly a major portion of the cost to the lender to produce the service rendered. "Present"
plant eliminates from consideration an imaginary plant and obviously
43Public

Utilities Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co.,

44 Simpson

271 U.S. 23, 32 (1926).

v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
4SIbid.
46 Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (19o9) (franchises); Des Moines Gas Co. v.
Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153 (19)
(as to paving).
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physical depreciation must be subtracted or we would not be dealing
with facts but with some different hypothetical plant. This is the element
called for in Smyth v.Ames and all cases since that date. At the time that
case arose there was no reliable evidence of a single source of that reasonable expenditure necessary to produce the plant existing at the time of
valuation. The issue was purely judicial-the ascertainment of that fact.
As in tort or crime or any other type of issue, the Supreme Court indicated
evidentiary facts which must be considered in a judgment of ultimate
fact. Is there any formula or rule of thumb for judicial determination of
fact in such cases? What it would now cost to build that plant was
judicially noticed in Smyth v.Ames as not the fact sought but was required
by the Court as a check, caution, or evidentiary fact. In the Southwestern
Bell case47 where no issue of plant efficiency was involved, the State Commission had not followed Smyth v.Ames in that it did not consider the cost
of reproducing the plant in use at the time of valuation, but in lieu of that
cost used an amount more than twenty-five per cent less. Adherence to
Smyth v.Ames required a rejection of the state commission's determination.
The language of Mr. Justice Butler "it is ciear that a level of prices
higher than the average prevailing in the ten years ending with 1923
should be taken as the measure of value of the structural elements on and
following the effective date of the rate order complained of" in the
McCardle case 4s has been mistaken as a benediction by the reproductionists. 49 We search in vain for any expressed intention on the part of the

Court to overrule Smyth v.Ames. The discussions by the Court arise from
the statement by the state commission whose determination was in issue.
It said: "Considering all the facts, including all the appraisals and other
evidence concerning the trend of prices, the commission is of the opinion
that in this case the average prices for the ten-year period ending with
i921, the last ten years available, most nearly represent the fair value of
the petitioner's physical property." The end of this average period was
more than two years before the rate order became effective. While the
average price so determined was higher than the original cost, it was lower
than the cost of reproducing the plant at the time of ascertaining the
legitimate expenditure to produce it. An arbitrary figure was taken, a
47 Missouri ex tel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276
(1923).
48 272

U.S. 400 (1926).

49 The personal viewpoint of a justice may differ from the opinion of the Court. Cf. the dissenting opinion in Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S.
388 (1938).
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formula, in effect, which was not even one of the evidentiary facts required by Smyth v. Ames to be considered. The peculiar localization of
this service strongly demanded the consideration of the evidentiary fact
of value, namely, the cost of duplicating the physical plant at the time its
value for rate-making was being determined, but the McCardle case is not
a holding that the cost of duplication of either the plant or the service is
the exclusive measure of value for rate-making. If a study of the case
itself leaves this conclusion in doubt, we may look to the subsequent
explanation of the Court itself to glean its intention in the McCardle case.
In the O'Falloncase,50 citing decisions from Smyth v.Ames to the McCardle
case, inclusive, the Court says: "The elements of value recognized by the
law of the land for rate-making purposes have been pointed out many
times by this court. Among them is the present cost of construction or
reproduction."' s Further, and consistently adhering to its long-declared
policy that this expenditure be determined in reasonable judgment weighing all relevant facts, the Court refrains from stating a formula, saying,
"the weight to be accorded thereto is not the matter before us. No doubt
there are some, perhaps many, railroads the ultimate value of which
should be placed far below the sum necessary for reproduction." (Is there
a formula in tort, crime, or contract that fits all cases?)
Neither reproduction new nor reproduction of the service has ever been
approved by the Court as the exclusive measure of the rate base. If one
were to be selected as the manner of determining the base the latter, although it does suffer from a hereditary ichthyosis, would have something
in theory to recommend it. The former was the measure contended for by
the State in Smythv.Ames. It continues to be contended for by the utilities in all cases where if accepted it would call for a higher base than would
result from any other recognized theory. We must now examine the other
theory of valuation presented in Smyth v.Ames, namely, the theory advanced by public utility.
XI
One of the oldest of the various so-called rate bases is "original cost."
It is the total financial sacrifice incurred by the security holders. It is
immaterial to this base whether the expenditures in setting up the properties were frugal or prodigal. It does not deal with present properties.
The base is permanent in quantity and is brought to date merely by
adding net expenditures. It is permanent or fixed in the sense that we
so St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461
s1Italics supplied.

(1929).
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refer to a fact, how many dollars have been contributed to the enterprise.
This was the base contended for by the carrier in Smyth v. Ames but it
was not accepted there and has subsequently been rejected by the Court
as the exclusive measure of the base. S2 While the court has definitely rejected this base as it has the cost of duplicating the physical plant or
reproduction new, both of which were claimed by the respective parties in
Smyth v.Ames as the exclusive measure of value for rate-making purposes,
it has recognized each as one of the relevant facts to be considered in
reaching a reasonable judgment of the cost of the plant.
As the original cost theory deals only with the sum contributed, the
elements of depredation, appreciation,3 and unearned increment are
wholly irrelevant5 4 Going value is relevant as the failure to obtain a
return on the investment until the business norm is reached is a loss or
part of the contribution or financial sacrifice of the investor. The chameleonic use of the word "depreciation" has led to much confusion. Smyth v.
Ames requires by its own statement the subtraction of physical depredation of the structural properties valued in order to establish what the
structural properties are for reproduction new. But the deduction of physical depredation from one of the evidentiary facts does not mean that it
should be deducted in the original cost theory or under any other theory,
or from the judgment estimate. This confusion has led some to feel that
the action by the Supreme Court in the Blue-Field Water ss Southwestern
Bell and Galveston Electric cases is approval for depreciating original cost.
Nothing is further from the fact. It would be appropriate, using depredation as equivalent to amortization, to set up monthly or annual depreciation or amortization charges and when so set up they should be deducted
from the base, original cost.56 This is so because these are in effect a repayment of the loan, and to the extent repaid is no longer owed. This confusion has led to citation of such cases as United States v. Ludey5 7 as
authority for depreciating original cost. But this case is neither an aid to
the reproductionists nor authority for depreciating original cost in rate
valuation. It may be used in analogy as authority for subtracting from
s, San Diego Land Co. v. National City Bank, 174 U.S. 739 (I899); San Diego Land Co.
v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439 (i9o3), Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin, 192 U.S. 201 (1904).
S3 Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (i9o9).
54Cf. Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 232 U.S. 655 (x912); Des Moines Gas
Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. '53 (1915); Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388
(1922); Georgia Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 262 U.S. 625 (1923).
ss Bluefield Water & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1928).
S6 Cf. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (I924).
S274 U.S. 295 (I927).
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value, under Smyth v. Ames a sum set aside as depreciation reserve in
amortization, but it has no bearing on the function of physical depreciation either under the original cost theory or in reproduction new. The
Ludey case arose under the federal income acts. "Gain" thereunder is the
selling price minus cost. Cost must be diminished by depredation and
depletion allowable as deductions. Before gain can be determined, these
computations must be made. Since their use was to ascertain whether or
not the cost had been exceeded by the return, it was necessary to allow
the amount of depredation, which had been allowable as a deduction
from gross income, as a deduction from cost. The function of the allowance was to equate selling price and cost. The depreciation allowable as
the deduction in gross income was analogous to a sale to that extent.
Under the statute these proceeds could not be touched until they exceeded cost. The purpose of the state to this extent was not to interfere
with the money of the taxpayer until his financial outlay had been inlayed. Thereafter he could have all he could make over a certain percentage. In rate-making a somewhat similar base might be subject to
amortization and over the amortization charges the utility might have
all it could make up to a certain percentage but no more. Certainly, the
Ludey case is not authority for subtracting physical depredation from
original cost in valuation for rate-making.
The outstanding virtue of the original cost theory as an exclusive base is
the simplicity of administration and the alleged stability of return. It is
very interesting to note the shift of the carrier from the position in Smyth
v. Ames to the extremely complicated reproduction new. If the trend of
prices continues indefinitely downward, it may be that "the turning away
from the simple shall slay them and the prosperity of fools shall destroy
them."sS With much justification the original cost base is attacked on the
ground that its outstanding supposed virtue of stability is mythical as it
links return to the dollar and due to inflation no real stability results;
and because expenses are at current costs while the return is on expenditure only. These claims are identical and well founded. They apply with
equal force to any theory which multiplies together two fixed elements for
rate-making purposes. While original cost has never been recognized as
the exclusive base for the reasons pointed out in Ames v. The Union
Pacific, but as the Court is always looking for the amount that was
reasonably necessary to produce the properties at the time of their construction, it naturally called in Smyth v. Ames for a consideration of what
was actually spent, and then proceeded to enumerate other evidentiary
58King James Translation, Proverbs

i :32.
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facts to be weighed against original cost to ascertain how much it should
be reduced. As stated by the Court in Regan v. FarmersLoan & Trust Co.s9
"justice demands that every one should receive some compensation for the
use of his money or property if it is possible without prejudice to the
rights of others." Therefore, original cost was primarily emphasized in
Smyth v. Ames and always since has been held relevant, subject to the
ascertainment of the extent to which it was, or is, unfairly prejudicial to
the rights of others.
XII
The original cost described as total pecuniary sacrifice to the investor
should be distinguished from historicalcost. The latter refers to the actual
cost of the present property. While historical cost deals with present
property, it is measured by the actual cost as a matter of history as distinguished from the present cost of duplication. The historical cost base is
frequently confused with the "prudent investment" base. Each deals with
the present property and with its cost, but prudent investment delimits
the cost of the present property to a reasonable expenditure-the amount
which under honest and efficient management would have been adequate
to produce the property at the time of its construction. The less imprudent and dishonest the construction expenditure, the nearer original
cost approaches historical cost, and the latter, in turn, the prudent investment. Historical cost is sometimes used as nearly synonymous with
prudent investment. In this sense it does not mean the historical narrative or enumeration of expenditures, but the history of prices contemporaneous with the construction of units used in the plant as a measure of
prudent expenditure.
The historical cost is subject to the same lack of reliability as original
cost with no greater merits as a measure of legitimate loan. Historical
cost, prudent investment, and original cost offer simplicity of administration and alleged stability of return. None are subject to charges for physical depreciation as in the case of reproduction new and to all should be
added going value. Stability of income and credit under each is said to be
fictitious as an attempt to produce stability of real income by tying it to
the dollar. It is said to discourage initiative in promotion and management as no inducement exists to improve service beyond the point of
maximum return. This latter argument was developed by the reproductionists during inflation of costs when the current costs of duplication
would be much greater. As the utility would be entitled to a return on
59 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
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current costs, it would be stimulated to improve the plant. It is also said
that on a long continued downward cost trend a point would soon be
reached at which public resentment to a return on an amount so greatly
excessive of current reproduction costs, that cost bases, however determined, must be abandoned. It is postulated in this paper that original
cost, historical cost, security issue and reproduction new are not exclusive
measures of the rate base. Historical cost has not been treated specifically
by the Court as it is included in original cost as used by it. These so-called
rate bases have all been required by the Court as aids to finding the
prudent investment. The legitimate assault by the reproductionists upon
the prudent investment, namely, that it fails to produce stability because
it links return to the dollar, is dealt with elsewhere herein. It is often said
that, other things being equal, return is rate times the base. Discussions
of the various rate bases generally treat, without explanation, the process
as if the multiplier (with the possible exception of the cost of reproduction
of the service) was for some unexplained reason immutably fixed and,
therefore, if reasonableness is the complexion of the product, necessarily
the multiplicand must be hitched to business, construction, and commodity cycles, to keep the product from blushing. In outlining the more common proponent-styled rate bases, this must be kept in mind. The fact
that we live in this world, and not in some other, and that we are dealing
with existing properties, should be remembered. Some of our self-serving
seers styling their preachings as "economic principle" would not only have
us imagine that the gigantic engine thundering by us is not only not there
but that we do not even know the location of the track on which it runs
and, therefore, a sum must be allowed for reconnaissance so that we may
go out and find where it is.°
XIII
Smyth v.Ames was an accumulation of all that went before. It has been
affirmed by all that has followed it. The Court was confronted with the
argument that the railroad was entitled to rates "which will enable it at
all times, not only to pay operating expenses, but also to meet the interest
regularly accruing upon all its outstanding obligations, and justify a
dividend upon all its stock; and that to prohibit it from maintaining rates
or charges for transportation adequate to all these ends will deprive it of
its property without due process of law and deny to it the equal protection
of the law."',, This contention was advanced as representing the financial
60Expert witnesses seem to be available for any sort of testimony. Cf. note 88 infra.
6
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sacrifice to establish the business.6 2 This is answered by showing that the
expenditures may have been imprudent, that the bonding may have been
excessive, and so not representing a fair measure of the necessary financial
sacrifice. The Court was seeking the cost of the property rendering the
service, or as the term is used interchangeably, the cost of the service; and
to find this, and having no accurate reliable primary evidence it balanced
the rights of the debtor public and the creditor corporation on the fulcrum
of "fair value." The carriers were contending for the cost of their property
as the base and this cost was to be measured by securities issued. They
were opposed by the argument that the present cost of reproducing the
property was the proper measure of that outlay. The Court directs its
attention to the carriers' argument and agrees that the contribution of the
carriers is the basis of return. Then to ascertain the amount loaned to the
public-the value of that which it employs for the convenience of the
public-the Court inquires (i) what was actually spent to build the plant,
(2) how much has been added to it since, (3) what securities were issued
and what they were worth, (4) the present value of the physical property,
and (5) working capital as evidence thereof. These were the evidentiary
facts of the ultimate fact-reasonable or prudent investment. The Court
treats with equal impartiality the debtor public. To measure whether or
not the debtor is paying too much interest if the amount thereof be measured as the carrier asked, it inquires how much the creditor loaned. The
facts evidencing that loan are set out above. To the extent that its business will permit, the creditor is entitled to a reasonable return thereon.
XIV
The Court also had before it a rate-making policy in regard to which it
directs a consideration under the contested rate to (i) probable traffic and
(2) to operating expenses (the rate was fixed by the statute before it).
Recognizing that the loan is a fixed sum and the interest or return is a
variable measured by (i) the rate, (2) the traffic and (3) the operating
expense, the Court then considers usury. This is a matter left to the ratemaking body. It is one which will vary with, and, as the Court says, must
be measured by all of the circumstances. Thus Smyth v. Ames, if followed,
would leave only the rate-making policy to be dealt with and there could
be an unconstitutional taking of property only when the interest allowed
62 How return came to be expressed as a percentage is apparent from the carrier's claim.
The money impounded was at issue. A consideration is always to be paid by the beneficiary.

The utility was confident of its expression in normal interest rates. The base contended for was
so high that charges to income could be disregarded. The same was true at later periods under
reproduction new claims.
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on the investment is more or less than the use of the loan is reasonably
worth at the time. The rate-making aspect of Smyth v. Ames is further
emphasized by the privilege extended to the rate-making body to apply to
the Circuit Court for the enforcement of the contested rate, if circumstances so changed that the statutory rate would provide the creditor the
compensation entitled. The product under the contested rate would not
have equalled operating expense or even a reasonable return upon the
lowest estimate of value, namely, reproduction new.
It must be borne in mind that the Court had considered value in many
taxation cases and a number of years before this case had found that value
to be the selling price of the property. The refusal of the Court to establish the same rule for valuation for rate-making purposes was to reject
earning power as the measure of rate-making present fair value. It was
the part of the total expenditure that could be determined with fairness to
both sides, the prudent or historical investment, that the Court sought.
And while the original cost was too excessive and imprudent through
jobbery and corruption to be taken as a base, it was, nevertheless, given
first place on the Court's list. The Court recognized that there might be
other evidence of the reasonable financial outlay other than those expressly enumerated. It is further evidence that the rule of Smyth v. Ames is the
prudent investment that the Court in always reaffirming that case has
allowed the consideration of other elements evidentiary thereof, for example, interest during construction, going-concern value, etc. The evidentiary facts of this base were selected by the Court with a view to (i)
fairness to investors in a regulated business and (2) adequate service at
reasonable rates. The Smyth v. Ames base is the cost or amount which
could have reasonably been paid to establish the existing plant used and
useful in the public service and the business. It is not the present value of
the present property, nor the actual cost of the present property, nor the
total contributions of investors, nor the cost of a substitute plant, 63 nor
the cost of a substitute service. It is the cost of service, which is a fact,
produced through an existing plant. It includes, therefore, as part of the
cost of such service, in addition to the physical plant, and as part of the
capital charge, such elements as going value and working capital. The
amount of going-concern value earned is a fact of history, as is the cost of
63 "It is elementary that value of a going concern may be less than, equal to, or more than,
present cost of plant less depreciation plus necessary supplies and working capital." Denver

Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 58 S. Ct. 99 o , 996 (1938).

This antipyretic to either original cost and reproduction new as exclusive alternate measures of the base was expressed by the Court through Mr. Justice Butler.
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putting the physical plant into operation. Private citizens came forward
with a bag of seed and sowed it in the public service. The Court is seeking
to ascertain how much thereof grew to fruition. Its conclusion is an estimate, a judgment estimate, taking into account all factors which should
have weight in fixing a sum which is fair both to the lender and to the
debtor community. (How else can a fact be judicially determined?)
That Smyth v. Ames was seeking to ascertain the outlay reasonably
necessary to set up the present plant, and not calling for repeated revaluation, is pointed out in the Referee's opinion in the Brooklyu Gas
case.6 4 That the cost of reproduction new is a variable is clearly recognized. It is also recognized that Smyth v. Ames requires that it be considered in fixing the rate base, but "it can not be said that there is a constitutional right to have the rates of a public service corporation based
upon the estimated cost of the reproduction of its property at any particular time regardless of circumstances." The variable is to be used as a
check or as an evidentiary fact in finding "the actual bona fide and prudent investment" which is the "fair value of the property" and as to which
"there must be a reasonable judgment based upon a proper consideration
of all relevant facts." If the rule of Smyth v.Ames gives a right to a reconsideration of all the evidence necessary in reaching a "reasonable judgment," one not unfair to either the public or the company, at each change
in the cost of reproduction new:
this would result in allowing a public service corporation to take advantage of a public
calamity by increasing its rates above what would be a liberal return, not only on ac-"
tual investment, but upon a normal reproduction cost, in the view that unless it could
make an essentially exorbitant demand upon the public it would be deprived of its
property without due process of law ..... Likewise, to base rates upon an estimated
cost of reproduction far lower than the actual bonafide and prudent investment because
of abnormally low prices would be unfair to the company s
In the opinion of the referee both propositions were expressly repudiated
by the cases cited.
That the relevant facts which include, among others, the cost of reproduction new, are merely evidentiary of the fact in issue, the actual bona
fide and prudent investment, which once established is no longer subject
to doubt, is the Referee's conclusion. If the corporation's history discloses
it, no further pursuit thereof is necessary. If it is known for only the latter
part of the corporation's history, the amount not so disclosed must be
judged from the relevant facts. To the judgment amount so determined
64 Brooklyn

Gas case (Charles E. Hughes, Referee), P. U. R. i9i8F, 335, 345-348.

6s Id. at 348. Italics added.
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under the rule of Smyth v. Ames must be added "the actual investment
since that time. There is no reason why there should be a substituted or
hypothetical estimate reaching an amount virtually in excess of the actual
66
investment."
With equal definiteness an attempt to make another of the relevant
facts evidentiary of the prudent investment, namely, original cost, the
rate base is rejected. The referee's opinion is permeated with the single'
purpose that fairness to each party is effected in finding what prudent
outlay was necessary to produce the present service. This includes, in addition to allowing the utility "credit for all the property it uses in the
public service," working capital, going-concern value if any, etc., and the
subtraction of the amount returned through amortization. The purpose
of the Supreme Court is shown in the opinion of the referee to determine
a historical fact and not to speculate in metaphysics of the future. If
the latter were in situation, he must have estimated going value upon
some nonexisting plant seeking to acquire an imaginary volume of business in an equally conjectural period of time. Instead he deals with things
that are, an existing plant presently rendering public service. He, therefore, denies the claim for an additional amount as going value to cover
alleged pioneer loss, because he says that from the beginning of the enterprise the utility had not failed to earn a return equivalent to the reason67
able norm in unregulated fields.
"IbM.
67Cf. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153 (1915): "Included in going
value as usually reckoned is the investment necessary to organizing and establishing the business which is not embraced in the value of its actual physical property. In this case, what may
be called the inception cost of the enterprise entering into the establishment of a going concern
had long since been incurred. The present company and its predecessors had long carried on
the business in the City of Des Moines, under other ordinances, and at higher rates than the
ordinance in question established. For ought that appears in this record these expenses may
have been already compensated in rates charged and collected under former ordinances. As
we have said, every presumption is in favor of the legitimate exercise of the rate-making power,
and it is not to be presumed without proof, that a company is under the necessity of making up
losses and expenditures incidental to the experimental stage of its business." A get-going cost
if you please.
To find the value of the physical property a commission must weigh (i)the cost to the date
of valuation (2) the cost of reproduction new and (3)the cost of reproduction less depreciation.
To be weighed with the cost of the physical plant are "other values and elements of value,"
other expenditures in establishing the business that may be charged as loan to the debtor
community. Cost means the expenditure or cash outlay throughout the history of the property,
of and since its dedication to public service, for construction and improvement, excluding
amounts representing property no longer in use. Against what was actually spent is balanced
what it would actually cost to build it now, namely, the present physical value or the cost of
reproduction new less depredation. With equal emphasis is required the consideration of the
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xv
Present fair value (a fact) was used in Smyth v. Ames to indicate a
weighing of all the facts which, being considered, would establish a sum
fair to both sides without involving any retroactive application of any
rate base theory not enforced by the state at the time of the loan. The
amount being fairly established need not be revised. The legislature has
power to say on what terms future increases shall be made. Both are
definite sums subject to accounting control governing maintenance
through operating expenses, amortization, etc. The word "present" is
used properly in connection with both the rate base and the rate. It is
present value of the property (present property) whose original cost is first investigated. That
is, the final value, reasonable value, or prudent investment, is to be ascertained by weighing
what the property cost against what it would cost at the date of valuation to find what it
should have cost.
If there are other elements of value they are to be added. These "intangible values" are
the reasonable expenditures of the creditor in bringing a plant to its norm of production. Going-concern value, working capital and cost of franchises are to be added. Going-concern value
is included because it represents the loss incurred by the creditor in putting his money in the
utility before production begins. It is limited to the norm because the public does not guarantee a reasonable return. If a reasonable return were forthcoming before the norm were reached,
this would mark the end of the period. The Constitution merely guarantees non-interference
with returns less than a reasonable return. If the investor has paid his money into a business
which is incapable of earning a reasonable return, he must bear the burden of his lack of business acumen. The capital necessary to operate the plant is as much a part of money advanced
by the creditor as is the money advanced to build the physical plant. The expenditure necessary to acquire the privilege to engage in the business is similar. These elements have been
passed upon by the Court and may be recognized by the legislator. This is not to saP that some
specific amount must be added to the base because of having a well established volume of business under some term as "going concern" merely because such might be considered in the exchange value of a competitive business. Of course the physical property is valued as a going
concern for otherwise it would have only scrap or salvage value. But as to any attached-business going-concer value "That element is not separate from or necessarily in excess of reasonable cost figures attributable to the plant." Denver Union Stockyards Co. v. United States,
58 S. Ct. 99o, 996 (1938). Italics added.
The inquiry as to the contribution of security holders is combined with the purpose of ascertaining the extent of water in securities and calls for the financial history. The purpose is to
ascertain owership and not ownership-the amount of the loan to public use. Each properly
requires a consideration of the evidentiary facts that will aid in reaching a reasonable estimate
thereof. The original cost, reproduction new, the amount and market value of securities, are
not merely bogies causing naevi but are the spore from which the final single sum judgment
estimate grows. The fixed base plus adjustments would make the extent of watered securities
promptly determinable at any time. If a state of facts, which as yet has not been found should
come to pass, namely, that not only are all expenditures and outlay thrifty and honest, but
also are known, then reproduction new will no longer be relevant. Then too the occasion for
distinction between historical cost, original cost and prudent investment will become immaterial as they approach identity and measure the cost to the investor to present the service rendered to the public. Reproduction of the service and exchange value base theories were excluded in Smyth v. Ames.
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properly used in connection with the rate base in establishing one of the
primary evidentiary facts, namely, reproduction new less depreciation.
As the object here is the value at the time of the investigation, depreciation is to be included. "Present" as of the time of the valuation calls for
depreciation to ascertain the actual physical property, for without considering this element the reproduction costs would be of a different property. "Present" as used by the Court in connection with the rate base has
never meant that a new base must be established for each future rate.
Once properly considered in connection with the other facts required in
establishing the rate base, there is no necessity of its subsequent reconsideration as its function is performed. All judicial determinations are
present determinations, however ancient are the evidentiary facts considered or the ultimate fact established. "Present cost" or "present value"
in connection with rate-making policy must be as of the time of each rate
making. This rule was declared in Smyth v.Ames and often repeated since.
Smyth v. Ames required a consideration of the probable earning capacity
under the rates prescribed.6 8 This is an estimate, with the results directly
affected by costs. Future costs must be predicted with present cost as a
point of departure. This meaning is made clear in the Southwestern Bell
case. Smyth v. Ames involved rate-making policy, as well as judicial factfinding. In the Southwestern Bell case the Court said
it is impossible to ascertain what will amount to afairreturnupon properties devoted
to public service without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc. at the
lime the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast of probable future
value made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances is essential. If the highly
important element of present cost is wholly disregarded such a forecast becomes impossible. Estimatesfor tomorrow can not ignore prices of today.69
In the latter case the Court was confronted with rate-making policy and
acted consistently with its position stated in Smyth v. Ames that present
costs were necessary in estimating the probable effect of the rate in issue.
One of the many important criteria in predicting that fact is the cost of
labor and materials. Necessarily they must be considered. The best evidence of their future cost is their present cost projected into the future by
present trends and anticipated events.
This conclusion is sustained by the decision in United Railways and
68 Cf. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 258 U.S. 165 (1922): "When it became dear-that the prescribed rate had yielded no fair return for more than a year, and that
this condition would most certainly continue for many months, the company was clearly entitled to relief."

69Italics supplied.
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Electric Co. v. West.70 The expression used by the Court therein, "it is the
settled rule of this court that the rate base is present value," is reproduction new. The Court goes on " .... and it would be wholly illogical to
adopt a different rule for depreciation." In connection with rate-making
policy with which the Court is there presented and not with the valuation
case, the Court says: "The purpose of permitting a depreciation charge
is to compensate the utility for the property consumed in service, and the
duty of the commission, guided by experience in rate-making, is to spread
this charge fairly over the years of the life of the property." The Court is
dealing primarily with rate-making policy. The depreciation dealt with
by the Court is depreciation in the sense of amortization. The rate base,
the amount of the loan, which is to be repaid through amortization charges
is the base measured by original cost as well as other elements.7 It would
be clandestine to measure the amount of the loan by one standard, and to
repay it by a different one. This is expressed by the Court: "The utility is
entitled to see that from earnings the value of the property invested is kept
unimpaired, so that at the end of any given term of years the original
investment remains as it was at the beginning. ' ' 72 Present value is used in
the same sense here that it was in all other cases under and since Smyth v.
Ames. In so far as the Court uses depreciation as meaning charges for
current maintenance, obviously replacement must be at current prices or
present value. It should also be noted that the manner in which the value,
subject to amortization charges against operating expenses, is raised on
the record, the presently agreed valuation is equivalent for the purpose
to a determination thereof under the rule of Smyt v. Ames. To test the
reasonableness of the anticipated return as a matter of rate-making policy,
it was necessary to consider the present cost of labor, materials, etc., in
order to estimate their effect upon such return.
XVI
Oversight of the simplest and primary principle in the whole program
of rate-making under judicial supervision that has led to needless confusion stems from the hoary phrasing that when property has become
devoted to a public use its prices may be regulated. This is no more than
a phrasing of "police power." The previously uncontrolled privilege to
pirate through prices has become subject to a condition subsequent and a
right of entry arises in the state. It is that to which the power to enter
arises that is mistaken. The plant is not taken but remains in the dominion
of the owner as private property under managerial control. He continues
70 280 U.S. 234 (193o).

7, Deductions for salvage values, and working capital, etc., are proper.

7' Italics added.
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to vend his goods to all takers very much as do unregulated owners. He
gains a franchise from the state, usually monopolistic and sheltered from
the tribulations of a competitor, which the state in turn prevents him
from abusing by substituting direct regulation for the regulation of competition. This franchise or certificate that the public convenience and
necessity are being served is at least quasi-contractual in nature and
specifically enforceable to the extent that once undertaken there is a very
limited privilege of withdrawal. The result is that through the property
the funds outlayed are impounded. No rate hearing is for the purpose of
expropriation of the property or capital. The issue is whether the use has
been appropriated. If the return is too low confiscation has resulted.
There is, therefore, no opportunity, whatever the judicial phrasing, for
applying exchange or eminent domain principles to the base.7 The results
of litigation show no such application and the language of the Court shows
its appreciation of the distinction. In Smyth v. Ames the Court said that
rates cannot be regulated so as to deprive the owner of "a fair return upon
the value of that which it employs for the public convenience." 74 The
Court was well aware of the fact that the properties were not on the
market as a commodity. No such allegation was even suggested by the
pleadings. In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. the result was compelled as the rate left no net income. The statement that had the state
been expropriating the plant it must pay "the value of the property as it
stood in the markets of the world, and not as prescribed by an act of the
legislature" is explained by the question "Is it any less a departure from
the obligations of justice to seek to take not the title but the use for the
public benefit at less than its market value?" 76 This dearly recognizes
that the issue is not on the taking of the propertybut only of the value of
the use of the impounded fund. The inquiry of the Court ended before it
came to any question of valuation of the property. It does indicate that
the latter must be related to available returns on similar risks. In the
opinion appealed from in Smyth v. Ames the Court, through Mr. Justice
Brewer, drew a similar analogy for distinction and emphasis saying that
"if the public were seeking to take the title to the railroad by condemnation, the present value of the property and not its cost" would be the
measure of compensation.7 7 Recognizing what it would require if the
property were being taken and that the plant was not being taken, it continues to consider the measure of the value of the use which was taken.
73 Their

applicability to the use which is alleged to be taken will be discussed later.

76Id. at 410. Italics added.
7s Note 59 supra.
should also be noted that it is cost and not market which the Court was treating as the
base. Cf. note 67 supra.

14At pp. 546, 54777 It
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"In like manner, it may be argued that, when the legislature assumes the
right to reduce rates, the rates so reduced cannot be adjudged unreasonable if, under them, there is earned by the railroad company afairinterest
on the actual value of the property." 8 The test, with explanatory modification, was approved on appeal. But the market test had no application
to the base. As has already been shown the relation of rates to market
value was well known to the Supreme Court and to the author of the
opinion in Ames v. Union Pacific Ry. The refusal of the Court to per-

mit interference with the base of Smyth v. Ames and to substitute any
present commodity market value was most emphatically repeated in
West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. and the distinction between
the taking of the property and the taking of the use of the property was
maintained. The Court said: "The established principle is that as the due
process clauses safeguard private property against a taking for a public
use without just compensation, neither the nation nor State may require
the use of privately owned property without just compensation." For
emphasis the distinction is repeated. "When the property itself is taken by
the exertion of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is its
value at the time of taking. So, [in alternative] where by legislation prescribing rates or charges the use is taken, just compensation assured by
these constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon that
value."' 79 The base value is violated only when the commission refuses to
fairly receive and weigh the facts evidentiary of value.5 " Eminent domain
value is not and cannot be its measure,8' but an analogy is drawn in determining the value of the use. This was done in Smyth v. Ames which
with all its descendants is cited. 2
As the Court on judicial review of the legislative administrative action
needs only to inquire if the plea of confiscation is justified, in so far as
the base or prudent investment is concerned, even though all of the relevant facts evidentiary of value have not been considered by the commission if the facts considered must prove a higher base than if all were
entertained, or conversely if the only possible operation of the omitted
facts would be to compel a smaller base, clearly there is no injury to the
owner. This was recognized in Los Angeles Gas &, Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California8'3 and followed in Denver Union Stock78Ames v. Union Pacific Ry., 64 Fed. 165, 177 (1894). Italics added.
79295 U.S. 662, 671 (1935). Italics added.
8oNote 5 supra.
8t Cf. Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. i8o, 203 (igio) a condemnation case where the
Court referring to the property said "both cases were rate cases and did not concern the ascertainment of value under contracts of sale."
8
1Id. note 6.
83Note 26 supra.
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yards Co. v. United States.8 4 In the first the evidentiary fact depended
upon was a conglomerate called "historical cost" and in the latter reproduction new. The result is the same so far as the issues therein were concerned.' The base used involved no confiscation of the properties. The
doctrine of Smyth v. Ames while approved was not affected either way.
If the rate is so low that no matter how the base is computed no part
of the return would be available as compensation for its use there is
confiscation. 86 Conversely, if the net operating income is so large that
no matter how the base is computed that more is received than the owner
has any right to claim the plea of confiscation must fail. 87 In neither
case is there a decision on what method of determination or resulting base
would be approved if the Court were required to pass on the issue.
This brings us to a consideration of the plea of confiscation as applied
to the value of the use as distinguished from the value of the property.
XVII
When the rate proceedings involve properties constructed before full
commission regulatory supervision was assumed the dearth of primary
evidence invites the gladiatorial technique of the lawyer to further his
client's interest as much as possible. Much of the commission's record
will be occupied by the testimony of expert witnesses. The lawyer asks
his economists, engineers, and accountants if there is any theory which
they can advance which will serve his purpose. And when the fee is large
it seems from the history of such testimony that any theory can be
adduced in evidence in a most pontifical tone. Censure of predacious
practices may not be in order. The important thing is that the tribunal
be competent to appraise the relevancy. "It is unnecessary to analyze
the testimony of these witnesses, as it is obviously too conjectural to
justify us in treating the failure to include their estimates as a sufficient
basis for a finding of confiscation." 8 8 As the rate order operates pro8458 S. Ct. 990 (1938).
8s Cf. Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938).

6 Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., i54 U.S. 362 (1894).
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U.S. 287,
(x933); and Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. i5i (1934).
88
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U.S. 287, 319
(1933). Would the word professional instead of expert be improper in some cases?
Where abstraction is substituted for reality one is reminded of the well-known Needle-Point
case. The more one ponders it the more seductive it becomes. Whether the method be induction or deduction there is opportunity for expression according to the taste until exhaustion
causes suspension-and then only animated suspension. Whether by postulate or premise the
pursuit becomes increasingly infectious as the elusiveness of the conclusion becomes constantly
more apparent. Marked difference is that here the actors appear as the cherubim.
To dispose of a consistent course of decision it would seem that something more substantial
87 Cf.
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spectively establishing a standard for future conduct it is said to be a
legislative as distinguished from a judicial function. 89 This gives a range
of policy expression not inherent in other types of official action.90 The
Constitution imposes a direct limitation on that choice by prohibiting
the imposition of a rate which will effect confiscation of the value of
the use of the impounded fund through a net operating income which
is less than the reasonable market for the use of funds in comparable
risks. 91 A vice common to much of the personnel of rate commissions
is the idea that theirs is the position of a party to an adversary proceeding. While the consumer is represented by the commission it is an
agency of the state to equate the interests of all. The utility is not an
outcast-only some of its obnoxious practices are contra bones mores.
The dependence of the community gives rise to the power to regulate
and from that dependency comes the conclusion that unless the utility
is healthy the community cannot be properly cared for. Too little nourishment injures both. Starvation violates the constitutional immunity of
the utility and it will be unable to serve the community well. Conversely,
overfeeding gives more than is needed either for the health of the utility
or the general welfare of the community. Standards must be established to effect financial stability. Financial stability depends upon
assurance that existing property will be protected plus the capacity
to attract additional capital. The safer the principal and the more certain a uniform return, the more readily new capital will be forthcoming
in diminishing costs. 9 2 To give the most efficient service at the lowest
must be offered than merely describing the conduct of the Court as "logomachy" and "dialectic."
It might be well to note the result of utilities' practices under another issue, namely, the
liability of common carriers from Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703) and Forward v.
Pittard, L. T. R. 27 (1785) through Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 6 How. (U.S.) 343 (x848) into
the second Cummins amendment, 39 Stat. 441, 442 (1916). It could hardly be said that they
were not vigilant.
89Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (i9o8).
90In the Nebbia case, note i8 supra, at 537, the Court said: ...."in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its pur-

pose."
91 Cf. notes 27, 29, 24, 28, supra and i 19 infra. "As the property remains in the ownership of
tke complainant, the question is whether the complainant has been deprived of a fair return
for the service rendered to the public in the use of the property." (Italics added.) Los Angeles
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
92Liberty bonds have been refinanced at lower rates. Treasury offerings have been most attractive when the hazard to principal in other fields has been great. "Acting Secretary Mills
announced yesterday subscriptions of $200,798,ooo had been received for tenders of $6o,ooo,ooo
of 9i-day Treasury bills offered August 3. The bills were dated August io and mature
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rate fair to the producer necessitates a large and constant inflow of capital.
The lowest rate charges to both the debtor and creditor must provide a
fair return under honest, efficient and economical management over and
above reasonable expenditures of maintenance of way, structures and
equipment. If this is true, private capital will be readily forthcoming.
If the inflow is so great as to deflect capital from other fields in amounts
more than are necessary for utility stability, rates are too high. Value is
merely an expression of a relationship between various economic interests
used to describe that relationship in regard to various property concepts.
This relationship or value is generally expressed and determined in terms
of money, but money is merely the medium of exchange described in dollars. Valuation for rate-making is analogous only to a limited extent to
valuation in condemnation proceedings. The determination of the base
alone does not establish whether or not the constitutional rights of the
owner have been recognized. It is a question of fact in every case as to
whether or not his return on the value of his property devoted to the
public service is reasonable. The obligation of the debtor community or
state as distinguished from the ordinary debtor-creditor relationship is
not to pay a fixed sum or number of dollars in the future but to protect
or assure the owner of the property from unreasonable taking and at the
same time to recognize the right of the community or debtor to be served
at a reasonable rate. There is no constitutional right of the owner of
property devoted to a public service to earn more than a reasonable return upon the fair value of his properties. Correlatively expressed, the
owner of such property is under a duty to provide the service rendered at
at reasonable rate. He is not entitled, as in competitive fields with unregulated properties, to a return measured by what traffic will bear. At
the same time he is protected through the duty imposed upon the ratefixing bodies to a return which will provide, to the extent that the traffic
will sustain the burden, a reasonable return on that value. The greatest
difficulty in valuation proceedings is to divorce the public mind from the
popular concept of the debtor-creditor relationship to pay in the future a
certain sum measured in terms of dollars. The rate-fixing body, representing both the debtor and the creditor in the peculiar relationship involved
in all valuation proceedings, must perform its duties to both parties impartially. If public service is to be rendered, by the devotion of private
capital to such enterprises, any method of valuation or rate-making which
fails to currently provide a return which will induce private capital to
November 9. The highest bid made the 99.878, equivalent of an interest rate of about 0.48
per cent annually, and the lowest 99.846, equivalent of an interest rate of o.61." Associated
Press, Sept. 7, 1931.
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enter the field of public service fails to discharge the duty of the ratefixing body to each party. If capital devoted to public purposes cannot
be assured of a return equivalent to that obtainable in services other
than those impressed with public interest, funds for their financing must
be forthcoming from other sources. The constitutional obligation, if it
may be so expressed, of the rate-making body, is to provide a rate to the
owner of such properties which will be equivalent to the return which
the money invested would produce to him if invested in comparable
risks. 93 Therefore, if the fixed base is established by the consideration
of all of the elements required in Smytz v. Ames, there is established for
all times for the purpose of rate-making the sum on which the investor
is entitled to a return, and the reasonableness of that return is to be
measured by the buying power or want-satisfying capacity of a similar
sum devoted to other available similar enterprises at any particular time.
The reasonable cost of the existing properties is their value for rate94
making-the amount loaned to the use of the community.
In the prognosis of the program of a rate structure there are many factors which are responsive to local conditions and the habitat of the utility
and subject to adjustment under the administrative policy of the commission. The dependency which gives the regulatory power tends with
improved standards of living to make the commodity (electricity, etc.)
a necessary and this calls for a rate adjustment which promises to bring
93 The importance to the owner of the valuation of the property as compared with the income therefrom varies about the ratio of one to sixteen.
94The use of the actual prudent investment as the base does not involve any hitching of the
base to the dollar so as to make the owner the victim of inflation and so contrary to due process
of law. We have seen that while the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames involves no market value for
the base it does involve a market (a market limited to a comparable risk) value for the use.
The base is expressed in money but the base money has of itself no value-its value arises as it
is a source of human wants or satisfaction. Money serves as a medium of exchange, with some
objectivity, but under state direction as an instrumentality with which to settle debts. Cf.
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S.
317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American
Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937). We have already adverted to wealth in regard to income taxes in connection with appreciation under the theory of reproduction new. The income
tax is relevant at this point for two reasons. It demonstrates that to retain capital at a fixed
sum and not subject it to economic corrective index multipliers is a well established and constitutionally recognized institution. While income taxes differ functionally from property taxes
for appraisement purposes, with the use the latter value has relevancy and the connotation of
income taxing has a familiar sound. The norm is to retain and express the capital fund in dollars without adjustment, (cf. Irving Fisher's theory of controlling dollar value by adjustment
of gold content) and to bargain in the current market for the amount of the consideration for
its use as income. This goes even further in loans represented by long-term fixed-income securities. To take advantage of lower use-of-capital costs call provisions are inserted in bonds.
Cf. Liberty Loan bonds and Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300
U.S. 324 (1937).
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it within the reach of all income groups. A downward adjustment may
be shown by appropriate evidence to predict a greater net operating income but mere guesswork is not enough.95 Where competing types of
utilities as gas and electricity producers are subject to the jurisdiction of
the same commission a similar problem exists. 96 These and others may
be used as goads to more efficient management and extended operation.97
The sliding-scale device may be used to further the local public policy.
XVIII
Space permits only reference to the determination of the return. We
have seen that Smyth v. Ames gives pertinence to the base only as an
element in the rate structure as an appoggiaturato test the adequacy of
the net income, and that through the equivalent of a forced sale by the
imposed regulation the value of the use is the present market of comparable risks. 95 Under this doctrine, subject to net additions and better95"We are not unmindful of the argument urged by counsel for the commission that the
effect of lower prices may be to swell the volume of the business, and by thus increasing revenues enhance the ultimate return. Upon the record as it comes to us, this is guesswork, and
no more. There has been no attempt to measure the possible enhancement by appeal to the
experience of other companies similarly situated or by any other line of proof. Present confiscation is not atoned for by merely holding out the hope of a better life to come." West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 79, 82 (1935).
96There is always the possibility of state competition as municipal ownership and Tennessee
Valley Authorities become more commonly accepted.
97"The question, then, is as to the estimates of revenue and expenses. The company complains that the commission's estimate of revenue was too high. The problem largely concerns
temperatures, and it is plain that the commission was justified, in fixing rates which were to
apply for a considerable period, in taking average temperatures. The District Court, with its
special knowledge of local conditions, and speaking in April, 1932, held that the action of the
commission was fair. The Circuit Judge supplemented this finding of the majority by his holding that there was "nothing unreasonable in the estimate of returns by the commission so far
as temperature is concerned" and that there was "nothing to indicate that due consideration
was not given to the possible effect of the depression upon the consumption of gas." Los
Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 320 (1933).
98Cf. United Railways and Electric Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 284 (1930). In Los Angeles Gas

& Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U.S. 287 (1933), the Court said: "We said in Bluefield
Water Works Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra, 262 U.S. 692, 693, that a 'public utility
is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it
employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right
to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.' We added that the return 'should be reasonably sufficient to assure competence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the
proper discharge of its public duties.' And we recognize that 'a rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business conditions generally.' See Smith v. fllinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. S3, i6o."
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ments, the base once determined need not be recomputed nor adjusted.
The use, however, is constantly subject to contemporaneous conditions. 99
Under existing statutes the commission is compelled to anticipate probable adjustments. The present is the basis for departure. The financial
history of the company, its relations and business opportunities as affected by local conditions, and the general situation as to investments
must be considered.-o Facts which experience indicates as having probative value are relevant in the formation of the judgment.o° The
costs are a prediction derived from trends with present costs as a point
of departure. They include the prices of the material and labor consumed
in current operation. These include expenditures for maintenance of way,
structures, and equipment. In making such determination the commission must give due consideration to the utility needs of the country and
the necessity of enlarging the facilities so as to provide an adequate system. From the earliest time the Court's objective has been reasonable or
prudent expenditure both as to construction and operation. Smyth v.
Ames included both. In Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company v.
Wellman, 0 2 the Court says in regard to current expenditures:
Surely before the courts are called upon to adjudge an act of the legislature fixing
the maximum .... rates for railroad companies to be unconstitutional, on the ground
that its enforcement would prevent the stockholders from receiving any dividends on
99 In West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., note 79 supra, the Court invalidated
the order because of the attempt to attach an improved base to a general commodity index.
This does not involve the measure of the value of the use of sound utility-indices with a proved
reproduction new.
loo Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U.S. 287, 319, 320 (N933).
lox "We think the adoption of a single year as an exclusive test or standard imposed upon
the company an arbitrary restriction in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and of
'the rudiments of fair play' made necessary thereby. The earnings of the later years were exhibited in the record and told their own tale as to the possibilities of profit. To shut one's eyes
to them altogether, to exclude them from the reckoning, is as much arbitrary action as to build
a schedule upon guesswork with evidence available. There are times, to be sure, when resort
to prophecy becomes inevitable in default of methods more precise. At such times, 'an honest
and intelligent forecast of probable future values, made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances' (Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 U.S.
276, 288; Los Angeles Gas &Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U.S. 287,
3 i1), is the only organon at hand, and hence the only one to be employed in order to make the
hearing fair. But prophecy, however honest, is generally a poor substitute for experience.
'Estimates for tomorrow cannot ignore prices of today.' Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission of Missouri, supra, at page 288 of 262 U.S. We have said of an attempt by a utility to give prophecy the first place and experience the second that 'elaborate
calculations which are at war with realities are of no avail.' Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151, 164. We say the same of a like attempt by officers of government prescribing rates to be effective in years when experience has spoken. A forecast gives us one rate.
A survey gives another. To prefer the forecast to the survey is an arbitrary judgment." West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U.S. 79, 8r (1935).
'

143 U.S. 339

(1892).
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their investments, or the bondholders any interest on their loans, they should be fully
advised as to what is done with the receipts and earnings of the company; for if so advised, it might dearly appear that a prudent and honest mnanagement would, within the
rates prescribed, secure to the bondholders their interest, and to the shareholders reasonable dividends. While the protection of vested rights of property is a supreme duty
of the courts, it has not come to this, that the legislative power rest subservient to the
discretion of any railroad corporation which may, by exorbitant and unreasonable
salaries, or in some other improper way, transfer the earnings into what it pleased to
call operating expenses. 3
This policy has been perpetuated through recent cases. In the Los
Angeles Gas case10 4 when it appeared from the financial history exorbitant
charges had been made for operating costs, which excess indicated that
on proper allocation would have provided an adequate net return, it was
"not necessary for the commission to make an annual allowance which in
the light of experience would be excessive." This placebo to alleged departure from Smyth v. Ames is emphatically re-expressed in Lindheimer
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co."°s It was pointed out early in this paper 6 that
the actual net result must be examined before the plea of confiscation
will be granted. If the examination shows that all to which the utility
is entitled has been received, it dearly has failed to sustain its burden
of proof to the contrary. How the operator has mis-labeled the receipts
allocable to net return is immaterial. "In determining ....
net return
* * *charges to operating expenses may be as important as valuations
of property. Thus excessive charges of $i,5oo,ooo to operating expenses
' ' °7
would be the equivalent of 6 per cent, on $25,000,000 in a rate base. b
Excessive charges were also made to operating expenses for a "depredation reserve." The sum of the excess charges exceeded annually the
amount which the commission's order reduced the net earnings. There
was no issue on the adequacy of the earnings prior to the effective date
of the order. The ultimate result is an admittedly adequate base and
return.10 Smyth v. Ames is confirmed. 0 9 The company's practice of
103Italics supplied.
104 Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 320 (I933).
100292 U.S.

ISI (1934).

"o

Note 24 supra.

107 Cf. note 93 supra. Shades of Billy Bryan's sixteen to one.
log "The foregoing considerations limit our inquiry. It is not necessary to traverse the wide
field of controversy to which we are invited and to review the host of contested points presented
by counsel. In the view that the existing rates cannot be regarded as inadequate, the question
is simply as to the effect of the reduction in net income by the rates in suit. The question is
whether the company has established, with the clarity and definiteness befitting the cause, that
this reduction would bring about confiscation." Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 304, 305

(1933).

lo Contra, Hale, Conflicting judicial Criteria of Utility Rates-The Need for a Judicial
Restatement, 38 Col. L. Rev. 959 (1938).
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excessive charges to what it called maintenance and depreciation was
in effect rebuilding the plant with consumers' money through the current maintenance account and at the same time taking its invested funds
out of the capital account through excessive charges to the so-called
depreciation account. The company's plan was to charge the consumers
for the use of their own money. Public welfare does not require that
this be allowed, and neither did Smyth v. Ames." 0 The admonition of
honest, efficient and economical management applies to plant additions
as well as to current operating costs. Attracting capital and the reasonable worth of services involves shares as well as bonds, for unpreferred
as well as preferred securities are necessary for the maintenance and extension of the enterprises." In calculating return by comparable risks,
it cannot be overemphasized that, assuming demand, the utility is
not a hazardous enterprise and that the application of the doctrine of
Smyth v. Ames raises even common shareholders into the position of
secured bondholders in competitive business. The reduction of the haz2
ard to principal and the assurance of income promises ready and cheap
loans. These assurances are attractive to capital.
Under the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames to the rate-making authority is
committed the task of ascertaining the prudent investment reasonably
necessary to produce the service rendered in fact, the determination of
what net operating income promotes the policy of the state and is fair
to the owner, and the prescription of rates adequate to produce such
110
The approval of the Court of basing amortizationcharges on the cost confirms my analysis of the Baltimore Railways case, note 70 supra. This is in accord with earlier declarations.
The company "is entitled to see that from earnings the value of the property invested is kept
unimpaired, so that at the end of any given term of years the original investment remains as
it was the beginning." City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (19o9).
- A point not yet clarified by decision arises in regard to proper charges. If fixed security
charges are paid as operating costs there seems to be doubtful validity in setting up the loan
in the base. While the Court has said that the source of the plant (omitting public donation) is
not material, that does not answer the question. If the rate were computed as a percentage on
the whole base omitting fixed security charges from operating expenses this would follow. It
seems a non sequitur, however, where the bond interest is charged to operating expenses. If B
borrowed $5o from C and loaned it with $50 of his own to D, D would not have to pay the interest on $15o or the interest on $ioo he borrowed from B plus the interest owed C by B.
- In a copyrighted advertisement (1938) Bank of New York & Trust Company published
the following statement: "Further development of the electric power and light industry, with
resultant benefits to national well being, depend largely upon its ability to attract sufficient
capital to undertake needed expansion of plant and distribution facilities."
In x932 the bonds of the Washington Gas Light Company were selling at a higher premium
than those of the United States. An increasing service demand and a more than average efficient regulation gave this result.
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return.13 The first, when finally determined, need only be adjusted for
net additions and betterments. The return must be declared periodically.
The declaration of the period is in the discretion of the commission and
depends on circumstances. While a permanent fixed standard has been
approved for the base,' 4 the Court has been careful to avoid approbation to any fixed rate, percentage or ratio. Under a fixed rate utility
security holders"15 would be at the mercy of the value of gold. This is
avoided by allowing the market rate for compaxable risks and permits
adjustment reflected by commodity prices." 6 While this doctrine makes
possible reasonably efficient and effective regulation its operation is open
to great improvement by legislation.

XIX
The chief administrative defect lies in the necessity under existing
practice of fixing the rate in advance. Because the value of the use depends on the current market, errors of prophecy result in a greater or
smaller return than contemplated. Experience reduces the probability of
variation but does not allow for correction. Litigation arises."Y7 A policy
X13Certainly it is as delicate an undertaking to determine in advance the value of the use
of a man for life either within or without workmen's compensation acts, yet no one bewails the
attempt.
114 Cf. State v. Dept. of Public Works, 143 Wash. 67, 254 Pac. 839 (1927).
Is "The distinctive feature .... is that the capitalization is not to exceed the actual value
of the property held for or used in the transportation service. One of the chief causes leading to
the public distrust of railroad financing is the deep conviction on the part of the people that the
past capitalization of many of the railways grossly exceeds the real value of the property which
renders the service. When the Interstate Commerce Commission finishes the valuation in
which it is now engaged and when those valuations, as they are judicially determined, and only
those values, pass into the capitalization of the newly organized or reorganized corporations
under this act, that serious obstacle in the way of effective regulation will have disappeared."
66th Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Rep. No. 304 on consolidation (1920).
n6 Cf. note 94 supra.
117There is no practical necessity for submission to the fickleness of the market and to let
the devil take the hindmost one. This is not trial and error which enlightens as any material
adjustment of the future market causes either or both parties to suffer. True rate control would
provide for correction and permit all to benefit by experience. The advantage of back-sight
rate-making has been recognized by Congress and the Court. The possible advantages afforded in the opportunity for assured accuracy in adjustments founded upon historical facts as
distinguished from prophecy in the Lindheimer and McCart cases were lost because of leechlike practices. Reasonable operating costs under efficient supervision over the test period become knowable facts. Such knowledge in regard to the value of the use would be even more desirable. The rate would cease to be a matter in terrorem which the operator must fight to the
last ditch at the consumer's expense. Certainly the State's police power is as great as that of the
United States. In Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924), the Court
said: "It was insisted in the two cases referred to, and it is insisted here, that the power to regulate interstate commerce is limited to the fixing of reasonable rates and the prevention of those
which are discriminatory, and that when these objects are attained, the power of regulation is
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of unduly liberal return would assure against confiscation through

subsequent price changes and would give special invitation to capital,
but this partially defeats the occasion for regulation and the adjustments
are reflected in the common securities. The reason why back-sight adjustment is not possible is that when no controlling statute is applicable the
excess vests in title in the operator as in any private property owner so
that past losses cannot be used to support an excessive future rate nor
can previous excessive rates be used to justify presently confiscatory
ones." 8 But these issues arose without legislative provision for corrective
adjustment. Is the legislature disabled by these decisions from providing
for corrective adjustment? The answer is "No." While mistakes of preregulation periods cannot be corrected as an afterthought, the power and
duty of the state is to maintain reasonable rates not merely to declare
them. The issue was met in the Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United
States." 9 The purpose of the rate-making policy in issue was to assure
a reasonable return upon the properties. The Court said that the utility
was not entitled as of constitutional right to more than a fair net operating
income, and that when provision was made in advance for correction of
return from a previously declared excessive rate the result was the same
as if the rate had been correctly stated in advance.120
In this manner stability of rates may be effected by an initial liberal
rate with subsequent adjustment of the impounded surplus. The balance
is subject to control and direction so that it could, under the supervision
of the commission, be transferred to income whenever the return under
any period should be too low. This, as stated by the Court, is rate-making
as much as the initial declaration. Under a competent commission the
adjustments would not be large. Income would be stabilized. Litigation
would be reduced to a minimum.
exhausted. This is too narrow a view of the commerce clause. To regulate in the sense intended
is to foster, protect and control the commerce with appropriate regard to the welfare of those
who are immediately concerned, as well as the public at large, and to promote its growth and
insure its safety."
Xs Cf. Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co., 27x U.S. 23
(1926)

and cases cited.

119263

U.S. 456

(1924).

"The reduction of the net operating return provided by the recapture clause is, as near as
may be, the same thing as if rates had all been reduced proportionately before collection. It is
dearly unsound to say that the net operating profit accruing from a whole rate structure is not
relevant evidence in determining whether the sum of the rates is fair. The investment is made
on the faith of a profit, the profit accrues from the balance left after deducting expenses from
the product of the rates, and the assumption is that the operation is economical and the expenditures are reasonably necessary. If the profit is fair, the sum of the rates is so. If the
profit is excessive, the sum of the rates is so. One obvious way to make the sum of the rates reasonable, so far as the carrier is concerned, is to reduce its profit to what is fair." Id. at 483.
Ile

